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The Resource Cooperation under the Shadow of the Future: Experimental Evidence from Infinitely Repeated Games

Cooperation under the Shadow of the Future: Experimental Evidence from Infinitely Repeated Games

Label
Cooperation under the Shadow of the Future: Experimental Evidence from Infinitely Repeated Games
Title
Cooperation under the Shadow of the Future: Experimental Evidence from Infinitely Repeated Games
Creator
Author
Summary
While there is an extensive literature on the theory of infinitely repeated games, empirical evidence on how "the shadow of the future" affects behavior is scarce and inconclusive. I simulate infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma games in the lab with a random continuation rule. The experimental design represents an improvement over the existing literature by including sessions with finite repeated games as controls and a large number of players per session (which allows for learning without contagion effects). I find that the shadow of the future matters not only by significantly reducing opportunistic behavior, but also because its impact closely follows theoretical predictions. (JEL C72, C73, C91, C92)
http://library.link/vocab/creatorName
Bo, Pedro Dal
Label
Cooperation under the Shadow of the Future: Experimental Evidence from Infinitely Repeated Games
Instantiates
Publication
Note
34573
Control code
ICPSR34573.v1
Governing access note
Access restricted to subscribing institutions
Label
Cooperation under the Shadow of the Future: Experimental Evidence from Infinitely Repeated Games
Publication
Note
34573
Control code
ICPSR34573.v1
Governing access note
Access restricted to subscribing institutions

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